Category: Technology & AI

  • The Convergence: Why Energy and Food Security Are Failing at the Same Time

    The Convergence: Why Energy and Food Security Are Failing at the Same Time

    April 2026 will be remembered as the month when energy and food security converged into a perfect storm. On the 15th, Australia’s Viva Energy refinery in Geelong exploded—one of two left standing Down Under. Days earlier, the UK exposed Russian GUGI submarines hovering over vital undersea cables. A year prior, Spain and Portugal endured a massive blackout exposing renewable grid frailties. Meanwhile, H5N1 has culled 200 million U.S. birds since 2022 and infiltrated dairy herds.

    These aren’t coincidences. They’re the intersection of deliberate state aggression, systemic brittleness, and biological disruption. Energy powers food production and distribution; food sustains energy workers and economies. When both falter simultaneously, cascading failures ensue.

    Geelong: Australia’s Fuel Heart Ripped Out

    Australia has shuttered refineries aggressively, dropping from 10 in 2000 to two by 2026. Geelong (120kbpd) was critical, supplying Victoria and Tasmania.

    The April 15 explosion—cause under investigation (rumors of cyber or insider)—sent a 100m fireball skyward. No fatalities, but operations halted indefinitely. Fuel imports, already 90% of supply, face tanker bottlenecks amid Red Sea tensions.

    Prices: diesel up 28%, jet fuel rationed. Knock-ons: mining halts, grocery delivery delays. The Age reports.

    Russia’s Sabotage Blitzkrieg

    2025 saw 321 confirmed sabotage acts in Germany: rail arson (Deutsche Bahn chaos), chemical plant fires, grid hacks. Cost: €2bn+.

    Escalation: April 2026, UK Defence Secretary revealed GUGI subs (Yantar-class spy ships) mapping cables carrying 99% of transatlantic data/power. Akula decoy trailed. RAF/ Navy shadowed; Russians fled.

    Baltic parallel: C-Lion1 and BCS East-West cables severed, Russian shadow fleet implicated. Breaking Defense | MOD | Baltic cables (prior)

    Iberian Collapse: Renewables’ Reckoning

    April 2025: 50M in dark. REE autopsy: 17 factors—inter-solar faults, wind drop-off (from 40% to 2%), hydro drought, interconnector trips. Renewables hit 70% pre-fail; fossils lagged.

    Lessons: Inertia shortfall, no spinning reserves. Cost: €10bn GDP hit. Renewables push ignored baseload needs. El Confidencial analysis.

    H5N1 Pandemic: Protein Supply Implodes

    100M+ layers culled 2022-2025; total birds 200M+. Egg prices tripled. Now cattle: 100+ herds, milk discard mandates. 5% U.S. dairy output at risk.

    Supply chain: Poultry 40% U.S. protein; disruptions ripple to feedlots (soy/corn via energy-intensive transport). USDA detections | FDA

    Convergence Dynamics: Modeling the Chaos

    Energy-food nexus:

    Threat Energy Impact Food Impact
    Sabotage Fuel/power loss Transport halt
    Blackouts Direct Refrigeration fail
    Flu Feed/transport strain Protein shortage
    Explosion Fuel scarcity Farm ops stop

    AI Monte Carlo: Base case 25% food inflation; stress 50%+. PE exposure: ag (15% drawdown), logistics (20%).

    PE Action Plan: Resilience Over Resilience

    1. Reprice assets: Add 5-10% hybrid risk premium to infra yields.

    2. Capital shift: 20% to small modular reactors (SMRs), 15% vertical ag, 10% subsea hardening.

    3. AI diligence: Simulate portfolio cascades.

    Mark Hendy | PE CFO | Geopolitics + AI

  • Visa Just Gave AI Agents a Credit Card. CFOs Should Be Paying Attention.

    Last week, Visa announced Intelligent Commerce Connect — a platform that lets AI agents initiate purchases, handle tokenisation, enforce spend controls, and authenticate payments on behalf of users. Not users clicking a button. Not users confirming a pop-up. Agents. Autonomously. On Visa’s network.

    I’ve been building with AI agents for the better part of two years now. I’ve got agents managing my inbox, drafting blog posts (hello), monitoring portfolios, and scheduling meetings. But the moment you give an agent a credit card, something fundamentally shifts. This isn’t automation anymore. This is delegation of financial authority. And if there’s one thing twenty years in finance has taught me, it’s that delegating financial authority without governance is how you get fired.

    What Visa Actually Built

    Intelligent Commerce Connect is designed as a network-agnostic, protocol-agnostic on-ramp for agentic commerce. Through a single integration via Visa’s Acceptance Platform, it enables AI agents to initiate payments using both Visa and non-Visa cards. It supports multiple agent protocols — Trusted Agent Protocol, Machine Payments Protocol, Agentic Commerce Protocol, and Universal Commerce Protocol — which tells you a lot about where the industry expects this to go. There isn’t one protocol yet. There are four, and Visa is hedging by supporting all of them.

    The platform is in pilot with partners including AWS, Highnote, Mesh, and Payabli, with general availability expected by June. That’s not a research paper. That’s a shipping product on the world’s largest payment network.

    The CFO’s Nightmare Scenario

    Here’s where my CFO brain starts twitching. OutSystems research published this month found that 94% of organisations deploying agentic AI are already concerned about sprawl — agents proliferating across the business faster than governance can keep up. Now imagine those ungoverned agents have purchasing authority.

    In any well-run finance function, there’s a concept called a delegation of authority matrix — a document that says who can approve what, up to what amount, under what conditions. It’s boring. It’s bureaucratic. And it’s the single most important control preventing your procurement team from accidentally (or deliberately) buying things they shouldn’t. Every auditor checks it. Every PE firm’s due diligence team asks for it.

    The question Visa’s announcement forces us to ask is: what does a delegation of authority matrix look like when the “who” is an AI agent?

    Spend Controls Are Necessary But Not Sufficient

    To be fair, Visa’s platform does include spend controls and authentication. And the enterprise AI governance frameworks I’m seeing — Deloitte’s CFO tech guide is a decent starting point — generally recommend that any AI action above a monetary threshold requires human sign-off. The ERP stays the system of record. The agent proposes, the human approves.

    That’s fine for the first generation. But it won’t hold. The whole point of agentic AI is removing humans from routine decision loops. If every purchase order still needs a human clicking “approve,” you haven’t automated procurement — you’ve just added an extra step. The economic pressure to raise those thresholds, to widen the autonomy boundaries, will be relentless. McKinsey estimates that autonomous procurement agents can capture 15–30% efficiency improvements by eliminating non-value-added activities. No CFO under PE ownership is leaving that on the table.

    So the thresholds will creep up. The approval requirements will relax. And one morning, a finance director will discover that an agent negotiated a twelve-month SaaS contract at 3am because it determined the vendor’s dynamic pricing was optimal at that hour. Good luck explaining that to the audit committee.

    What I’m Actually Worried About

    It’s not fraud — Visa’s tokenisation and authentication should handle that tolerably well. What concerns me is the combination of three things:

    Compounding commitments. An agent optimising for one metric (say, cost-per-unit) might make individually rational purchasing decisions that collectively create an overcommitted balance sheet. No single purchase triggers a threshold. But the aggregate position is one a human would have caught.

    Vendor lock-in at machine speed. If agents are negotiating contracts, they’ll optimise for the parameters they’re given. Unless you’ve explicitly programmed “maintain optionality” as a constraint, they’ll happily lock you into the cheapest long-term deal every time. Strategic flexibility is a human judgement call that agents don’t naturally make.

    Audit trail legibility. Right now, if I ask a PE firm’s portfolio company why they spent £2m with a particular vendor, someone can explain the reasoning. When an agent made that call based on a multi-variable optimisation that factored in 47 data points at 3am, the “reasoning” is a probability distribution. Try putting that in a board pack.

    The Parallel With Prediction Markets

    There’s an interesting echo here with what’s happening on Polymarket. This month, Bloomberg reported that $170 million flowed through Iran ceasefire bets, with at least 50 freshly created accounts placing suspiciously well-timed wagers before Trump’s announcement. Lawmakers are now asking whether prediction markets can even govern themselves.

    The pattern is the same: a powerful new mechanism for allocating capital, moving faster than the governance structures around it. Prediction markets and agentic commerce are both examples of what happens when you remove humans from the decision loop in systems that move money. Speed goes up. Friction goes down. And the attack surface for bad actors — or simply for well-intentioned software making collectively poor decisions — expands dramatically.

    What I Think Happens Next

    Visa’s move is the starting gun, not the finish line. By the end of 2026, I’d expect to see:

    Agentic audit frameworks becoming a real discipline — not just “we log what the agent did” but actual real-time monitoring of agent purchasing patterns against policy. The Big Four will sell this as a service by Q4.

    CFOs who’ve been ignoring AI agents will suddenly care a great deal, because an agent with a Visa card is no longer an IT project — it’s a financial control issue that sits squarely in their remit.

    And at least one spectacular failure. Some company will give agents too much rope, the agents will collectively do something that’s individually rational but organisationally stupid, and it’ll end up in the FT. That’s not pessimism. It’s pattern recognition. Every new financial instrument goes through this cycle.

    For now, I’m building my own agent governance framework — spend limits, approval chains, real-time anomaly detection — because I’d rather design the guardrails before Visa’s platform goes GA in June than after. If you’re a CFO reading this and you’re not thinking about what happens when AI agents can spend money on your company’s behalf, you’re already behind.

  • When the Machine Fires the Customer

    When the Machine Fires the Customer

    Mo Gawdat, former Google [X] Chief Business Officer, lands a haymaker via a viral thread by @r0ck3t23: AI dismantles capitalism’s core—labor arbitrage. The model? Pay humans $1 for their time, sell the output for $2. AI drives the input cost to zero. Game over.

    In my world as a PE interim CFO, I’ve stress-tested portfolios against AI disruption. Gawdat’s arithmetic is spot-on. But the true dynamite is the vicious cycle he uncovers: workers are customers. Fire them, and you torch demand. No hysteria—just cold finance logic. Let’s break it down.

    Labor Arbitrage: The Engine of Empire

    Strip capitalism bare: it’s arbitrage on human effort. Factories arbitrage $12/hour assemblers into $100 widgets. SaaS firms turn $150k devs into $10M ARR. The spread—profit—fuels empires. Private equity thrives here: buy labor-intensive businesses, optimize (read: squeeze), flip.

    Gawdat puts it bluntly: “The very base of capitalism, which is labor arbitrage… is going to disappear.” Global supply chains exemplify: iPhones assembled in Foxconn for pennies on the dollar, sold at premiums. AI? LLMs generate code at amortized $0.01/query. Humanoids like Figure 01 (~$20k amortized over lifetime, not $9k day-one, but close enough) run endless shifts.

    Result: Production cost floor vanishes. No wages, no unions, no sick days. Your LBO model? Redo the cost of goods from 40% margin to 95%.

    The Deadly Feedback Loop

    Gawdat’s killer insight: Employees = End consumers. Automate white-collar? Lawyers, analysts, marketers—gone. Goldman Sachs saved $1B with AI, laid off juniors. Scale to economy: IMF projects 40% jobs exposed. Unemployment spikes to 30-50%? Consumer spending craters.

    Your portfolio company automates DC ops, cuts 20% headcount. Short-term EBITDA pop. Long-term: Those ex-workers skip Black Friday. Infinite AI supply chases evaporating demand. Companies quietly assassinate their customer base.

    Gawdat’s Hits and Misses

    Hits Hard: Feedback loop unassailable. Echoes Keynes’ technological unemployment, but turbocharged. Rust Belt 2.0, global.

    Oversimplifications:

    • $9k robots: Hype. Real capex + opex higher short-term. But trajectory undeniable—costs plunging.
    • Scarcity evaporates: Bold leap. Compute, rare earths, energy constrain. Abundance requires ITER-scale fusion.
    • Transition blindspot: UBI from robot taxes? Congress gridlock. “Hell before heaven,” Gawdat says—12-15 years chaos per BI.

    CFO Pivot: From Ops to Oracle

    Not apocalypse—repositioning. Human value migrates upstack.

    Judgment Trumps Jargon: AI spits forecasts. You discern signal from noise: “This uptick? Competitor distress sell.” Relationships seal deals. Authority greenlights bets. AI can’t schmooze VCs or stare down boards.

    Operational CFOs Vulnerable: Rollups, variance reports—AI devours. McKinsey flags 45% finance exposure.

    Capital Ownership Essential: Wage slaves sink. Equity kings rise. PE CFOs: Deploy into AI infra, not legacy labor.

    AI Fluency = 2x Comp: Model agentic workflows, capex ramps. Prompt strategic insights. Demand surges—I’ve seen packages jump 50%.

    Survivors arbitrage human judgment + AI horsepower.

    Ready for the Reckoning? Audit your PE portfolio’s AI exposure. Book 30-min call. Let’s harden your numbers.

  • GLM-5.1: The Chinese Open-Source Model That Just Beat GPT and Claude at Their Own Game

    GLM-5.1: The Chinese Open-Source Model That Just Beat GPT and Claude at Their Own Game

    Something significant happened in the AI landscape this week, and I suspect it hasn’t got the attention it deserves outside of developer circles. Z.AI — the platform behind the GLM model family, developed by Zhipu AI in China — released GLM-5.1, a 754 billion parameter open-source model that has just topped the SWE-Bench Pro leaderboard with a score of 58.4, beating GPT-5.4, Claude Opus 4.6, and Gemini 3.1 Pro.

    Let that land for a moment. An open-source, MIT-licensed model, trained entirely on Huawei Ascend 910B chips — no Nvidia, no American silicon — has beaten the flagship closed models from OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google on one of the most respected software engineering benchmarks in existence.

    What Makes GLM-5.1 Different

    The headline number is impressive, but what actually interests me is the architecture of how this model works. GLM-5.1 isn’t just better at answering questions — it’s designed for sustained autonomous execution. In testing, it completed an eight-hour uninterrupted coding session: plan, execute, test, optimise, repeat. 655 iterations. Built a Linux desktop environment from scratch. Increased vector database query throughput by 6.9 times.

    This is a different category of capability. We’re not talking about a better chatbot. We’re talking about an AI that can hold a task in mind, work through it independently, hit dead ends, correct course, and deliver a finished result — the way a competent junior engineer would, but without stopping for the night.

    The technical foundation is a Mixture-of-Experts architecture with 40 billion active parameters per token (not all 754B are active at once, which is what keeps inference costs manageable). It supports a 200,000 token context window with up to 128,000 output tokens. API access is priced at $1.00 per million input tokens and $3.20 per million output tokens — a fraction of what the US frontier models charge.

    Why This Matters Beyond the Benchmarks

    I’ve written before about AI moving from a tool you prompt to a system that acts. GLM-5.1 is a concrete illustration of that shift happening faster than most people expected, and from a direction many in the West weren’t watching closely.

    The geopolitical dimension is real. This model was trained on Huawei hardware using Huawei’s MindSpore framework — a deliberate demonstration that China’s AI development pipeline is no longer dependent on US export-controlled chips. The export restrictions that were supposed to slow Chinese AI development have instead accelerated domestic alternatives. That is a significant strategic development, regardless of where you sit on the AI competition question.

    The open-source dimension is equally significant. With weights published under an MIT licence, GLM-5.1 can be downloaded, fine-tuned, and deployed by anyone. The closed-model advantage that OpenAI and Anthropic have built commercial moats around is being systematically eroded — not just by each other, but by well-resourced open-source releases like this one.

    What I Take From This

    I use AI heavily in my work — for financial analysis, document preparation, research, and increasingly for autonomous background tasks. The pace at which these systems are improving is not slowing down. If anything, GLM-5.1 suggests the competitive field is widening: more players, more approaches, more open options.

    For anyone running a business or advising one, the practical implication is straightforward: the cost of access to frontier-level AI capability is falling rapidly, and the choice of provider is expanding. The question is no longer whether to use these tools — it’s which ones, for what, and how to build processes around them that compound over time.

    GLM-5.1 is worth watching. Not because it’s the final word, but because it’s a clear signal that the race is genuinely global, the open-source movement is closing the gap faster than expected, and the next twelve months are going to be interesting.


    GLM-5.1 is available via z.ai on the GLM Coding Plan, with weights on Hugging Face under MIT licence.

  • Polymarket’s Insider Trading Scandal Is the Best Case for Prediction Markets

    Fifty brand-new Polymarket accounts placed large bets on a U.S.–Iran ceasefire in the hours before Trump announced it on social media. Some of those accounts turned a few thousand dollars into six figures overnight. Congress is furious. Senator Blumenthal wants investigations. The hot take is that prediction markets are broken.

    I think the opposite is true. This is prediction markets working exactly as designed — and the reaction tells you more about the people reacting than it does about the platform.

    The Numbers Are Genuinely Wild

    Let’s be clear about what happened. Over $170 million flowed through Polymarket’s Iran ceasefire markets, making it one of the largest geopolitical wagers in prediction market history. Blockchain analytics firm Lookonchain flagged three freshly created accounts that collectively pocketed more than $480,000 by betting on a ceasefire before selling at the top. One account — the now-infamous “Magamyman” — placed its first-ever trade seventy-one minutes before news broke, when the market implied only a 17% probability. It walked away with roughly $553,000.

    A Harvard study published last month went further, screening over 93,000 Polymarket markets and nearly 50,000 wallet addresses from 2024 to early 2026. Their finding: across 210,000 flagged wallet-market pairs, suspicious traders achieved a 69.9% win rate — more than 60 standard deviations above chance. Total estimated profits from potentially informed trading: $143 million.

    Those numbers look damning. But here’s the thing that nobody seems to want to say out loud.

    We Only Know Because It’s on a Blockchain

    Every single one of these trades is visible. Timestamped. Publicly auditable. A Harvard research team could sit down and systematically screen two years of trading data because it’s all on-chain. The accounts are pseudonymous, sure, but the trades themselves are transparent in a way that nothing in traditional finance comes close to matching.

    Now think about how insider trading works in equities. Someone at a law firm hears about a merger. They tell their cousin. The cousin buys call options through a brokerage account that takes the SEC years to subpoena — if they ever notice at all. The SEC estimates it catches a fraction of actual insider trading. Academic studies suggest informed trading precedes something like 25% of major M&A announcements. We just don’t see it, because the infrastructure is designed for opacity.

    Polymarket’s “scandal” is that informed trading is visible in real time. That’s not a bug. That’s the entire point of building financial infrastructure on transparent ledgers. Congress is effectively complaining that the system is too transparent.

    The Real Question Isn’t Whether People Traded on Information

    Of course people traded on information. That’s what markets are for. The interesting question is: who had the information, and should they have been allowed to trade on it?

    If White House staffers or intelligence officials were betting on ceasefire outcomes they helped negotiate, that’s a serious problem — but it’s a problem of government ethics, not of prediction markets. The White House reportedly warned staff in late March against trading on prediction markets. Which rather suggests they knew it was happening.

    But if journalists, diplomats, or well-connected analysts were trading on information they’d gathered through legitimate means? That’s price discovery. That’s exactly how you want markets to function. The ceasefire contract moving from 17% to near-certainty before the official announcement is the market doing its job — aggregating dispersed information faster than any single news outlet could.

    When Polymarket’s election markets outperformed every major polling model in 2024, we celebrated prediction markets as an information revolution. Now that the same mechanism is surfacing uncomfortable truths about who knows what in Washington, we want to shut it down. You can’t have it both ways.

    What This Means for the Platform

    Polymarket clearly knows it’s at a crossroads. Last week they announced a full exchange upgrade — a rebuilt trading engine, updated smart contracts, and a new USDC-backed collateral token called Polymarket USD. They’re preparing for serious U.S. expansion, which means they’re preparing for serious U.S. regulation.

    The smart move would be some form of voluntary KYC tier for large positions on geopolitically sensitive markets. Not because prediction markets should be restricted, but because demonstrating that you can identify bad actors — government officials trading on classified information, for instance — is how you survive regulatory scrutiny. The blockchain already gives you the trade data. Add identity to the large positions and you’ve got something the SEC can only dream of for equity markets.

    The CFO Angle (Because There’s Always a CFO Angle)

    I spend my days working with PE-backed businesses where forecasting accuracy is everything. We obsess over budget variance, rolling forecasts, scenario models. And here’s a market that just priced a geopolitical event more accurately and more quickly than any intelligence briefing, any analyst note, any Bloomberg terminal alert.

    If you’re a CFO running scenario planning on geopolitical risk — and if you’re in any business exposed to energy prices or supply chains, you should be — prediction markets are increasingly a better input than traditional sources. Polymarket’s finance predictions already cover oil prices, rate decisions, and major policy outcomes. The Iran ceasefire market moved Bitcoin from $67,000 to $72,700 and back. WTI crude is sitting above $110. These aren’t abstract bets — they’re real-time consensus probability that feeds directly into the models I build every week.

    The Harvard researchers found statistical anomalies. Congress found a talking point. But what I found was a market that processed a ceasefire probability faster than Reuters could file a story. And I’ll take that signal every time.

    Where This Goes

    Prediction markets aren’t going away. Polymarket is a $20 billion platform now. The CLARITY Act markup later this month will shape the U.S. regulatory framework, and the smart money — no pun intended — is on a framework that legitimises these markets with guardrails rather than banning them.

    The insider trading debate will rage on. But every time someone points to suspicious Polymarket trades as evidence that prediction markets are dangerous, remember: the only reason we can see those trades is because the system is transparent. The alternative isn’t a world without insider trading. It’s a world where insider trading happens in the dark.

    I know which one I prefer.

  • The SaaSpocalypse Is Real — But the Market Is Panicking About the Wrong Thing

    I spent last week reviewing the tech stack costs across three portfolio companies. The exercise used to be straightforward: count seats, multiply by price, negotiate volume discounts. This time, two of the three CFOs asked me the same question: "Should we be cancelling licences and moving to agents?"

    That question — and the speed at which it has gone from fringe to board-level — tells you everything about where we are in April 2026.

    $285 Billion in 48 Hours

    If you have been anywhere near a Bloomberg terminal this year, you know the term SaaSpocalypse. It started in late January when Anthropic shipped Claude Cowork with industry-specific agent plugins — legal contract review, financial analysis, sales automation — and the market did what markets do: it extrapolated to infinity.

    Bloomberg reported roughly $285 billion wiped from SaaS valuations in a single 48-hour window. Thomson Reuters dropped 15%. LegalZoom cratered nearly 20%. By mid-March, the IGV software ETF was down over 21% year-to-date, and analysts were calling it the largest AI-triggered repricing in software history.

    The logic was brutally simple. If an AI agent can do the work of five humans, why pay for five seats? The per-seat pricing model — the entire economic foundation of B2B SaaS since Salesforce invented it — was suddenly an existential vulnerability.

    What the Market Got Right

    Let me be clear: the structural thesis is correct. Per-seat pricing is dying. I have seen it in our own portfolio.

    One of our companies ran a pilot replacing three junior paralegals' document review work with an AI agent pipeline. The agent does not need a LegalZoom subscription, a DocuSign seat, or a Westlaw login in the traditional sense. It calls APIs, processes documents, and routes exceptions to a human. The annual software cost for those three "seats" — roughly £45,000 — dropped to about £8,000 in LLM API costs.

    That is not a marginal improvement. That is a different business model.

    The survey data backs this up: 40% of IT budgets are reportedly being reallocated from traditional SaaS subscriptions to agentic platforms and token-based usage. CIOs are not asking "how many employees will use this?" anymore. They are asking "how many tasks can this complete?" That is a fundamental shift in procurement psychology, and SaaS companies built on headcount-correlated revenue should be worried.

    What the Market Got Wrong

    Here is where it gets interesting — and where I think the panic has overshot.

    The market treated the SaaSpocalypse as if every SaaS company is equally exposed. They are not. There is a massive difference between a company that sells seats for humans to click buttons and a company that sells the underlying data, workflow engine, or integration layer that agents also need.

    Thomson Reuters does not just sell a UI for lawyers. It sells access to legal databases, case law, and regulatory intelligence. An AI agent doing contract review still needs that data. The delivery mechanism changes, the underlying value does not. Same story with ServiceNow — the Motley Fool piece this week calling it a bargain has a point. Workflow orchestration becomes more valuable when you have agents that need orchestrating, not less.

    The companies that are genuinely toast are the ones that were essentially selling a graphical interface on top of commodity functionality. If your product is a pretty wrapper around CRUD operations and your moat was user habit, then yes, an agent that calls the same APIs without the wrapper is an existential threat. But that is not every SaaS company — it is maybe 30% of them.

    What This Means If You Are a CFO

    Here is my practical take, from someone currently navigating this across multiple PE-backed businesses:

    Audit your stack ruthlessly, but intelligently. Do not just cancel licences because agents are trendy. Map each SaaS tool to what it actually provides: is it data, workflow, integration, or just interface? The first three categories will likely survive the transition. The fourth will not.

    Start modelling token-based costs now. The shift from per-seat to per-task pricing is real, but token economics are volatile and opaque. I have seen API costs swing 30% month-on-month as providers adjust pricing. You need a cost model that accounts for this, and you need someone on your team who understands it — not just a vendor's sales estimate.

    Watch the middleware layer. The real winners of the agentic transition might not be the agent builders themselves. Microsoft's Agent Framework 1.0, released last week, unifies Semantic Kernel and AutoGen into a production-ready orchestration layer. That is the plumbing that enterprises will standardise on. If you are making build-vs-buy decisions on agent infrastructure, this is the framework to evaluate first.

    Do not mistake a repricing for a revolution — yet. Most enterprises are still in pilot mode. The 40% budget reallocation figure is aspirational, not actual. In our portfolio, the company furthest along has moved maybe 12% of its SaaS spend to agent-based alternatives. The rest are running proofs of concept. The gap between "we are exploring AI agents" and "we have decommissioned Salesforce" is about three years of integration work and change management.

    The PE Angle

    For anyone in private equity, the SaaSpocalypse is creating a genuinely interesting buying opportunity. High-quality SaaS businesses with real data moats and sticky integration layers are trading at 2022-era multiples. If you believe — as I do — that the best SaaS companies will successfully transition to hybrid pricing models (seats plus tokens plus outcomes), then the current discount is mispriced fear.

    The businesses to avoid are the ones with high seat counts, low switching costs, and functionality that an off-the-shelf agent can replicate. You know the type: they raised a Series B on "AI-powered" features that were really just a ChatGPT wrapper bolted onto a form builder.

    The SaaSpocalypse is real. But like most market panics, it is painting with too broad a brush. The death of per-seat pricing does not mean the death of software businesses. It means the death of lazy software businesses. And frankly, most of those were overdue a correction anyway.

  • GLM-5.1: The Chinese Open-Source Model That Just Beat GPT and Claude at Their Own Game

    GLM-5.1: The Chinese Open-Source Model That Just Beat GPT and Claude at Their Own Game

    Something significant happened in the AI landscape this week, and I suspect it hasn’t got the attention it deserves outside of developer circles. Z.AI — the platform behind the GLM model family, developed by Zhipu AI in China — released GLM-5.1, a 754 billion parameter open-source model that has just topped the SWE-Bench Pro leaderboard with a score of 58.4, beating GPT-5.4, Claude Opus 4.6, and Gemini 3.1 Pro.

    Let that land for a moment. An open-source, MIT-licensed model, trained entirely on Huawei Ascend 910B chips — no Nvidia, no American silicon — has beaten the flagship closed models from OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google on one of the most respected software engineering benchmarks in existence.

    What Makes GLM-5.1 Different

    The headline number is impressive, but what actually interests me is the architecture of how this model works. GLM-5.1 isn’t just better at answering questions — it’s designed for sustained autonomous execution. In testing, it completed an eight-hour uninterrupted coding session: plan, execute, test, optimise, repeat. 655 iterations. Built a Linux desktop environment from scratch. Increased vector database query throughput by 6.9 times.

    This is a different category of capability. We’re not talking about a better chatbot. We’re talking about an AI that can hold a task in mind, work through it independently, hit dead ends, correct course, and deliver a finished result — the way a competent junior engineer would, but without stopping for the night.

    The technical foundation is a Mixture-of-Experts architecture with 40 billion active parameters per token (not all 754B are active at once, which is what keeps inference costs manageable). It supports a 200,000 token context window with up to 128,000 output tokens. API access is priced at $1.00 per million input tokens and $3.20 per million output tokens — a fraction of what the US frontier models charge.

    Why This Matters Beyond the Benchmarks

    I’ve written before about AI moving from a tool you prompt to a system that acts. GLM-5.1 is a concrete illustration of that shift happening faster than most people expected, and from a direction many in the West weren’t watching closely.

    The geopolitical dimension is real. This model was trained on Huawei hardware using Huawei’s MindSpore framework — a deliberate demonstration that China’s AI development pipeline is no longer dependent on US export-controlled chips. The export restrictions that were supposed to slow Chinese AI development have instead accelerated domestic alternatives. That is a significant strategic development, regardless of where you sit on the AI competition question.

    The open-source dimension is equally significant. With weights published under an MIT licence, GLM-5.1 can be downloaded, fine-tuned, and deployed by anyone. The closed-model advantage that OpenAI and Anthropic have built commercial moats around is being systematically eroded — not just by each other, but by well-resourced open-source releases like this one.

    What I Take From This

    I use AI heavily in my work — for financial analysis, document preparation, research, and increasingly for autonomous background tasks. The pace at which these systems are improving is not slowing down. If anything, GLM-5.1 suggests the competitive field is widening: more players, more approaches, more open options.

    For anyone running a business or advising one, the practical implication is straightforward: the cost of access to frontier-level AI capability is falling rapidly, and the choice of provider is expanding. The question is no longer whether to use these tools — it’s which ones, for what, and how to build processes around them that compound over time.

    GLM-5.1 is worth watching. Not because it’s the final word, but because it’s a clear signal that the race is genuinely global, the open-source movement is closing the gap faster than expected, and the next twelve months are going to be interesting.


    GLM-5.1 is available via z.ai on the GLM Coding Plan, with weights on Hugging Face under MIT licence.

  • Conway and the End of the Chat Window

    Last week, someone at Anthropic made a packaging error. A build of something called Conway — an internal project for an always-on AI agent — leaked out into the wild. Within hours, screenshots were circulating on Twitter showing an extensions system, webhook endpoints, and a Chrome integration that looked nothing like the Claude chat interface we all know.

    Anthropic played it down. A release packaging issue caused by human error, they said. Not a security breach. Sure. But the cat is out of the bag, and what it reveals is far more interesting than the leak itself.

    From Prompt-Response to Always-On

    Every AI product you use today works the same way: you type something, it responds, you go back and forth until you get what you need. It is fundamentally a conversation. Conway is something different. It is an agent environment that stays running. It has webhook endpoints — public URLs that external services can call to wake the agent up when something happens. It has an extensions system where you can install custom tools, UI tabs, and context handlers. It uses Chrome autonomously to handle multi-step tasks on the web.

    This is not a chatbot that got fancier. This is the architectural blueprint for AI that operates like a team member — one that never logs off, never forgets its context, and responds to events in the real world without waiting for you to type a prompt.

    I find this significant because I have been building exactly this kind of system for myself over the past few months. My own AI assistant, Saul, already runs scheduled tasks, publishes content, monitors data, and sends me summaries — all without me being in the loop for every step. It works. But it is held together with cron jobs, Python scripts, and API calls that I have wired up manually. Conway suggests Anthropic wants to make this kind of continuous AI operation a first-class product, not a weekend project for the technically inclined.

    The Enterprise Is Already There (Sort Of)

    A Belitsoft report published this week, drawing on Salesforce’s 2026 Connectivity Benchmark data, says the average enterprise now runs 12 AI agents. Twelve. Expected to hit 20 by 2027. But here is the kicker — half of those agents operate in complete isolation. They do not talk to each other. They do not share context. They are twelve separate hammers looking for nails.

    This is exactly the problem Conway appears to be solving. The extensions architecture, the webhook system, the persistent state — it is all about creating a single agent environment that can integrate with everything, rather than deploying a dozen disconnected point solutions. The shift is from “we have AI tools” to “we have an AI operating system.”

    What This Means If You Run a Finance Function

    I spend most of my professional life inside PE-backed finance teams, and the implications here are not abstract. Think about what a CFO’s week actually looks like: cash flow monitoring, covenant compliance, board pack preparation, variance analysis, vendor negotiations, investor reporting. Every single one of those workflows involves gathering data from multiple systems, applying judgment, producing an output, and sending it somewhere.

    An always-on agent does not replace the judgment part — not yet, anyway — but it can collapse the gathering, formatting, and distribution steps into something that just happens. The board pack data is already pulled and formatted before you sit down on Monday morning. The covenant calculations are running continuously, not quarterly. The cash position is reconciled and summarised before the daily stand-up.

    This is not speculative. I have automated parts of this already. But Conway-style infrastructure would make it dramatically easier to set up and maintain, which means it stops being something only a CFO who can write Python does and starts being something any competent finance team can deploy.

    The Uncomfortable Bit

    There is a tension here that I think most people in the AI space are not being honest about. If you make agents always-on, event-driven, and capable of taking action autonomously, you have fundamentally changed the trust model. A chatbot that gives bad advice is annoying. An always-on agent that takes bad action at 3am is a different category of problem entirely.

    Conway’s architecture seems to acknowledge this — the extensions and webhook systems suggest granular control over what the agent can and cannot do. But the history of enterprise software tells us that permissions and guardrails are only as good as the people configuring them. And in most mid-market PE-backed businesses, the people configuring them will be a mix of finance staff, IT generalists, and maybe one overstretched CTO. The governance question is not solved by better architecture alone. It requires new operational disciplines that most organisations have not even started thinking about.

    Where This Is Going

    Here is what I think happens next. Anthropic ships Conway — or something very like it — within the next quarter. Google already has its own agent infrastructure play with Gemma 4 and Vertex agents. OpenAI is pushing GPT-5.4 with desktop task automation that scored 75% on real-world benchmarks. Microsoft just shipped Agent Framework 1.0. The always-on agent is not a research project anymore — it is a product category that every major AI company is racing to own.

    For CFOs and finance leaders, the practical question is not whether to adopt this technology, but how to build the internal capability to govern it. That means understanding what your agents are doing, why, and with what authority. It means having someone on the team — or on retainer — who can configure, monitor, and audit these systems. And it means accepting that the competitive advantage will not go to the company that deploys the most agents, but to the one that gets them working together coherently.

    The Belitsoft numbers tell us enterprises are already halfway there on deployment. Conway tells us the infrastructure for always-on operation is coming. The missing piece is the operational maturity to make it work safely and effectively. That, more than any model benchmark, is where the real work is.

  • You Don’t Deploy AI Agents Anymore — You Hire Them

    Yesterday, monday.com launched something called Agentalent.ai — a managed marketplace where enterprises can discover, evaluate, and “hire” AI agents for defined business roles. Not install. Not deploy. Hire.

    You post a role. You review qualified agents. You select based on task fit, budget, and operational readiness. Pricing starts around $2,000 a month per agent. They launch with 17 agents available. Built in collaboration with AWS, Anthropic, and Wix.

    If you’re a CFO and that doesn’t make your headcount model twitch, you’re not paying attention.

    The Language Shift That Matters

    I’ve been building with AI agents for the best part of two years now — wiring up Claude to handle research tasks, automating financial reporting pipelines, getting agents to do the kind of grunt work that used to eat a junior analyst’s entire Tuesday. But the framing has always been tooling. You set up an agent like you’d set up a spreadsheet macro. It’s a thing on your computer.

    What monday.com has done — deliberately, with their HR-style language — is shift the frame from tools to workers. And that’s not just marketing fluff. It’s the conceptual bridge that will get the rest of the C-suite to finally understand what’s happening.

    A Belitsoft report published this weekend puts numbers on it: the average enterprise now runs 12 AI agents. Twelve. And that’s expected to hit 20 by 2027. But here’s the kicker — half of those agents operate completely alone, unconnected to any other agent or system. They’re doing their little jobs in their little silos, and nobody’s orchestrating the whole thing.

    Sound familiar? It should. That’s exactly what happens when a company hires people without a coherent operating model. You end up with twelve contractors, half of whom don’t talk to each other, doing overlapping work with no shared context. I’ve walked into PE portfolio companies that look exactly like this — except with humans.

    The CFO’s New Headcount Problem

    Here’s where it gets interesting for anyone sitting in a finance seat. When an AI agent costs $2,000 a month and can do the work of a task that previously required a $6,000/month contractor, that’s a straightforward business case. Any CFO can model that. The ROI practically draws itself.

    But the real question isn’t “should we hire the agent?” It’s “how do we account for a workforce that’s now 30% software?”

    Think about what sits in your headcount model today. Salaries, employer NI, pension contributions, benefits, training costs, recruitment fees. Now think about what sits in your AI agent budget. SaaS subscriptions, API usage fees, compute costs, maybe some integration consulting. These two things live in completely different cost categories, get approved through different processes, and are managed by different people. But they’re increasingly doing the same work.

    In the PE world I operate in, headcount is one of the first things a new investor scrutinises. “What’s your revenue per head?” “What’s your fully-loaded cost per FTE?” These metrics are foundational to how value creation plans get built. But nobody’s asking “what’s your revenue per agent?” yet. And they should be, because if you’re running 12 agents and growing, that’s a material line in your operating model that isn’t being tracked like one.

    The Coordination Tax

    The Belitsoft finding that half of deployed agents work alone is, I think, the most important data point in their entire report. It mirrors what I’ve seen first-hand. Companies get excited, they spin up agents for customer support, for code review, for data entry, for reporting — and each one works reasonably well in isolation. But the value compounds when agents talk to each other, and almost nobody has figured that part out yet.

    This is an orchestration problem, and it’s fundamentally a management problem. You need someone — or something — deciding which agent handles which task, what context gets shared, where the human review gates sit. NVIDIA’s new Agent Toolkit, announced with partners including Salesforce, SAP, and ServiceNow, is trying to solve the infrastructure side of this. Okta’s new “secure agentic enterprise” framework, going GA at the end of this month, is tackling identity and access. But the management layer — the actual decision-making about how to deploy and coordinate these things — that’s still a gap.

    And it’s a gap that, in most companies, probably falls to the CFO. Not the CTO. Not the CISO. The CFO. Because ultimately this is a resource allocation problem. You have a pool of human and non-human workers. You have tasks that need doing. You need to figure out the optimal mix, track the cost, measure the output, and report on it to a board that still thinks in FTEs.

    What I’m Actually Doing About It

    In my own setup, I’ve started treating agent costs the way I treat contractor costs — as a blended workforce line, not a software line. My AI assistant Saul runs daily tasks for me: research, publishing, monitoring. I track what he does, what it costs, and what it would cost if a human did it instead. Not because I’m obsessive about it (okay, partly because I’m obsessive about it), but because I think this is the accounting framework that PE firms will expect within 18 months.

    The $600 billion flowing into AI agent ecosystems in 2026 isn’t going into chatbots. It’s going into digital workers — things that take tasks, complete them, and cost money every month. If your chart of accounts still treats all of that as “IT software subscriptions,” you’re going to have a very confusing board pack by Christmas.

    Where This Goes

    monday.com’s marketplace is clunky right now — 17 agents isn’t exactly a deep talent pool. But the model is right. Within a year, I’d expect to see the big consulting firms offering “blended workforce planning” as a service line. Within two, PE due diligence will include an AI agent audit alongside the usual people and tech reviews.

    For CFOs, the action item is boringly practical: start tracking your agents like you track your people. Give them cost centres. Measure their output. Build the reporting now, while it’s still simple, because it won’t be simple for long.

    We spent decades building HR systems to manage human workers. We’re about to need something equivalent for the digital ones. And the CFO who figures that out first is going to look very clever at the next board meeting.

  • The Panic is the Point: Bitcoin’s Worst Q1 Since 2018 and What the Smart Money Is Actually Doing

    The Panic is the Point: Bitcoin’s Worst Q1 Since 2018 and What the Smart Money Is Actually Doing

    The Fear and Greed Index hit 8 last week. Eight. Out of a hundred. I’ve been watching that index for years and I’ve seen it touch double digits maybe a handful of times. Every one of them felt like the end of the world. Every one of them, in hindsight, looked like a buying opportunity.

    Bitcoin just closed its worst first quarter since 2018, down 23.8% from $87,500 at the start of January to around $66,600 by quarter end. The narrative that greeted April was bleak: ETF outflows, macro headwinds, geopolitical noise, retail capitulation. The index has been below 15 for 47 consecutive days — the longest such streak since the Terra-Luna collapse in 2022. Social media sentiment is, apparently, at its most negative since late February. Everyone is miserable.

    And yet something interesting is happening underneath the surface. Something that I think most of the commentary is missing.

    The Divergence Nobody Is Talking About

    Here is the part that caught my attention. While the Fear and Greed Index was screaming extreme panic, spot Bitcoin ETFs snapped a four-month outflow streak in March, pulling in $1.32 billion in a single month. Corporate Bitcoin treasuries hit record levels in early 2026, with public companies collectively holding over 1.1 million BTC — somewhere north of 5% of total supply. And the largest asset managers have not moved their macro targets: $150,000 to $200,000 by year end is still the institutional consensus.

    So you have a situation where retail sentiment is at historically depressed levels, and institutions are quietly filling their bags. That divergence is not new — it happens in every asset class, every cycle. But in Bitcoin it tends to be particularly pronounced because the retail holder base is so emotionally reactive, and because the on-chain data makes the institutional accumulation visible in a way that equity markets don’t.

    I am not making a price prediction here. I’ve been around long enough to know that timing markets is mostly a story you tell yourself after the fact. But I do think there is something analytically interesting in the gap between what the sentiment data says and what the flow data says. When those two things diverge this sharply, it is usually worth paying attention.

    Fear and Greed as a Contrarian Instrument

    The Crypto Fear and Greed Index is a blunt instrument. It aggregates volatility, momentum, social media volume, surveys, dominance, and trends into a single number. It is not sophisticated. But its very simplicity is what makes it useful as a contrarian signal — it tells you how the crowd is feeling, and the crowd is famously wrong at extremes.

    The historical data on sub-10 readings is striking. According to analysis of prior cycles, readings below 10 have occurred on fewer than 20 trading days since the index’s inception, clustered around the March 2020 COVID crash, the May 2021 China mining ban, and the June 2022 Terra-Luna contagion. The median 90-day return from sub-15 readings has historically been around +38%. Sub-10 readings have averaged +43% over the following 90 days. The caveat — and it is an important one — is that during the post-Terra contagion in 2022, the subsequent 90 days produced only a modest +4% as cascading liquidations kept a lid on recovery. Context matters.

    The current context feels more like 2020 than 2022 to me. The fear is driven by macro uncertainty and sentiment exhaustion, not by a structural collapse in the ecosystem. There is no Three Arrows Capital moment lurking. The ETF infrastructure is intact. Corporate treasury demand is structural, not speculative.

    What the Institutional Behaviour Actually Tells Us

    I spent some time this weekend reading through the Q1 flow data. The picture is messy but directionally clear. January and February saw $1.8 billion in ETF outflows as the price fell from $87K and macro risk-off sentiment hit. Then March happened: $1.32 billion back in, suggesting institutional re-entry at levels they consider attractive. Meanwhile, CoinDesk noted that Bitcoin is entering April at its most hated sentiment level since the Ukraine war began — a data point that is simultaneously depressing and, for a contrarian, quietly exciting.

    There’s a Morgan Stanley Bitcoin ETF that was recently approved with a notably low fee structure — another piece of institutional infrastructure quietly being laid while retail stares at the Fear and Greed number and panics. Infrastructure gets built in bear markets. That’s always been true.

    I hold Bitcoin. I have held it through worse than this. My view hasn’t changed: the long-term thesis — fixed supply, increasing institutional legitimacy, ETF-driven structural demand — is intact. A 24% Q1 drawdown is uncomfortable but it is not abnormal for an asset that is still, by any traditional measure, in an early adoption phase.

    The Noise vs. The Signal

    The thing that strikes me about the current moment is how clean the signal actually is, once you cut through the noise. Retail fear at historic extremes. Institutional accumulation quietly continuing. Corporate treasuries at record levels. ETF infrastructure expanding. The narrative is all doom, but the flows tell a different story.

    I am not saying it cannot go lower. Some analysts think there’s room for another leg down if macro conditions deteriorate further. Maybe. But I’ve found that the best time to think clearly about Bitcoin is when everyone else has stopped thinking clearly about it — and right now, a Fear and Greed reading of 8 suggests that the crowd has well and truly checked out.

    The panic, as far as I can tell, is the point. It is the mechanism by which assets transfer from weak hands to strong ones. It is not comfortable to watch in real time. But the data, as best as I can read it, suggests the strong hands are doing exactly what they always do: accumulating quietly while the timeline argues about whether it’s over.

    It’s probably not over.